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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL LIBERTIES - SEGREGATION
ON INTRASTATE TRAVEL
Upon entering respondent's bus, where Negroes seat from the rear and
Whites from the front, petitioner, a Negro on an intrastate journey, was
refused the last empty seat. The sole reason given was that he was a Negro
and the last available seat was beside one already occupied by a white per-
son. Such contiguous seating was prohibited by statute.' Petitioner asked
for injunctive relief from discrimination claiming an unconstitutional inter-
pretation of the segregation statute by respondent. Held, group2 segregation
is not discrimination if facilities are equal as between the races, even though
at times an individual of either race5 must suffer. Commonwealth v. Caro-
lina Coach Co. of Virginia, 66 S.E.2d 572 (Va. 1951).
The constitutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine, which per-
mits segregation of the races if facilities for each race are equal, has been
consistently upheld.4 Under this doctrine facilities do not have to be identi-
cal, but only substantially equal." However, recently the courts seem to
interpret substantially equal as practically identically equal. The con-
stitutionality of segregation statutes does not depend Upon either the number
of persons involved or the frequency of the discriminatory incidents af-
fecting one person.8 The courts have held that, though such a statute be
constitutional, the enforcement or interpretation of it might be unconstitu-
tional.9 Opposed to group segregation is the right of the individual to equal
1. VA. CODE ANN. (1950) § 56-326 "All motor carriers of passengers . . , shall
separate the white and colored passengers . . . and set apart and designate in each
motor vehicle a portion thereof or certain seats therein to be occupied by white pas-
sengers and a portion thereof or certain seats therein to be occupied by colored
passengers. . . ." § 56-327 ". . . carriers . . . shall make no difference or discrimination
in the quality or convenience of the accommodations provided for the two races. ... "
§ 56-328 ". . . no contiguous seats on the same bench shall be occupied by white and
colored passengers at the same time
2. Italics supplied by writer.
3. Italics supplied by writer.
4. E.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900); Briggs v. Elliott,
98 F.Supp. 529 (1951). Doctrine is first set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); but see Note, Plessy v. Ferguson Reexamined, 49 COL. L. REV., 629 (1949). The
doctrine has been strongly criticized, e.g., Note, 30 NEB. L. BULL. 69 ("This doctrine
should be irretrievably interred").
5. McCabe v. A.T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
6. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Davis v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 760, 30 S.E.2d 700
(1944).
7. See Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941).
8. See Carter v. School Bd., 18 F.2d 531, 534-535 (4th Cir. 1950); Corbin v.
County School Bd., 177 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1949).
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); cf. Society of Good Neighbors v.
Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949).
CASES NOTED
protection of the law'0 which has been an undercurrent of several vigorous
dissents" and recently the basis of a few majority opinions.12 Upon the
basis of individual rights the United States Supreme Court has struck down
discrimination in interstate commerce,' 8 in restrictive covenants' 4 and in
education on the graduate and professional level in state-supported schools. 15
However, in other areas subjugation of individual rights to group segregation
based on theories of states rights'0 have been upheld and followed through
stare decisis.17
The instant case presents a clear conflict of these two ideas: group segre-
gation versus individual rights. The majority opinion, almost in toto,
founds its support on the early case of Plessy v. Ferguson, where the court
was concerned with balancing the equities between races rather than indivi-
duals. This court admits that its definition of discrimination is not based
on equality of treatment, since one might have to stand "and thus undergo
a minor inconvenience not then incurred by others."' 9 The court declined
to give any significance to any of the petitioner's cited cases,20 and dismissed
them because none dealt with the "precise question here presented."'" Thus
the majority reached the conclusion that the law in regard to the question
of racial segregation had not changed since 1896,22 nor have any possible
reasons arisen for the court to change it now.
The vigorous dissenting opinion, setting forth the opposing doctrine of
individual rights, deserves separate discussion in view of this unusual stand
by a supreme court justice in a southern state.28 His concise analysis of the
10. This principle was first expunded in dissent by justice Harlan in Plessy v.
Ferguson, supra note 4 at 552.
11. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, suura note 4 at 552-64 (Justice Harlan); Slaughter-
'house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 111.124 (U.S. 1873) (Justice Bradley); Henderson v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 80 F.Supp. 32, 39-42 (Md. 1948).
12. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, supra note 6; Sweatt v. Painter, supra note 6; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948); Mitchell v. United States, supra note 7; Carter v. School Bd,, supra
note 8; Corbin v. County School Bd., supra note 8.
13. E.g., Henderson v. United States, supra note 12; Mitchell v. United States,
sut ra note 7.
14. Shelly v. Kraemer, supra note 12. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (racial zoning).
15. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra note 6; Sweatt v. Painter, supra
note 6.
16. See discussion of state's right to protect local custom in Chiles v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1910).
17. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, supra note 4.
18. SuPra note 4.
19. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, 66 S.E.2d 572, 578 (Va.
1951).
20. Henderson v. United States, supra note 12; Buchanan v. Warley, supra note 14;
Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir, 1951); Washington, B. & A. Elec. Ry. v.
Waller, 289 Fed. 598 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 577.
22. The date of decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 4.
23. The writer's research fails to disclose any cases decided on the question of
racial segregation in any southern state in which a dissent has been taken on the basis
of individual rights.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
more recent segregation-discrimination cases and -similar Virginia statutes 24
was soundly reasoned and ably supported. It is the dissent's view that though
the federal courts decided certain recent cases25 under the Interstate Com-
merce Act,20 their language defined discrimination generally27 to be an abuse
of the right of the individual to equal protection of the laws,28 and thus
applicable to intrastate29 commerce. If the criterion of discrimination is to
be the effect on the individual rather than the group, the distinction between
interstate and intrastate traffic is immaterial. Since an interstate Negro
passenger would not be refused this seat,30 it is discrimination to this indi-
vidual petitioner, an intrastate passenger, to be refused this seat.3' Virginia
has an almost similar statute82 which regulates segregation on electric
vehicles but which prohibits contiguous seating "unless or until"3 all of the
other seats . . . shall be occupied. 13  The dissent treats all segregation
statutes as pari materia so that the "unless or until" limitation should apply
to all." As a result of this reasoning the dissent is able to hold for the
petitioner, and still uphold the validity of the statute.
The dissent in setting forth the definition of discrimination as being
an abuse of the rights of the individual, at the same time upholding the
constitutionality of segregation statutes, creates a conflict within its own
opinion, since it would seem that individual rights per se are incompatible
with segregation. However, this is unimportant since the constitutionality of
this statute was never questioned. Should this case come before the United
States Supreme Court it would seem to present a proper opportunity for
that Court to sustain the dissent concordantly with its present trend.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ANCILLARY ACTION FOR FOREIGN
DIVORCE ENJOINED
Pending final judgment in a separation action brought by defendant's
wife in a New York court, wherein defendant had appeared generally, de-
fendant established residence in the Virgin Islands where he sued plaintiff
24. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-390, 56-391, 56-392 (1950) (regulating segregation on
electric railways); VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56.396, 56-397 (1950) (regulating segregation on
steam railroads); VA. Corm ANN., §§ 56-452, 56-453 (1950) (regulating segregation on
steamship lines).
25. Henderson v. United States, supra note 12; Mitchell v. United States, supra
note 7; Chance v. Lambeth, supra note 20.
26. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1946).
27. Italics supplied by writer.
28. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 579.
29. Italics supplied by writer.
30. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (segregation statute in instant
case held unconstitutional on an interstate commerce basis). In New v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 186 Va. 726, 43 S.E.2d 872 (1947), it was held that the Morgan case only
applied to interstate passengers, not intrastate passengers.
31. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 580.
32. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-390, 56-391, 56-392 (1950).
33. Italics supplied by writer.
34. VA. CODE ANN., § 56-392 (1950).
35. Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia, supra note 19 at 581.
